LICENCE TO KILL LICENCE to KILL? The Troubles in Northern Ireland: a topic that has captured the attention of the entire European continent. Blood curdling events, senseless bombings, tit-for-tat shootings & atrocities that sounded the death knell for 3,700 innocent people; but also information about British Intelligence Services colluding with Loyalist {Unionist} Death Squads -as revealed in "LICENCE TO MURDER" documentary- are a drop in the ocean compared to what witnesses of that bleak era could narrate. Not until the reader has delved deep into the deep resentment of Catholics, who felt the were systematically discriminated against & the apprehension of Unionists, worried about Protestant dominance being touch-and-go can the Troubles be brought to light. With Unionists accepting partition of Ireland so that Northern Ireland would remain part of the UK & Nationalists quashing it so that it would be united to the Irish Republic (Eire), the next blast seemed to be around the corner. Reprisals & counter-reprisals were on the daily agenda -and the world recoiled in horror... FREEDOM FIGHTERS or RUTHLESS TERRORISTS? Were the IRA shoring up the nationalist community & waging war against injustice or merely leaving behind then a trail of devastation in their wake? On Bloody Sunday (1972), which spurred the British Army to enter the no-go areas of Belfast & Londonderry, one wouldn't touch them with a barge pole. "Crime is Crime is Crime" Thatcher wouldn't even dream of granting prisoner-of-war status to those jailed in Maize prison for paramilitary-related crimes. Were really those Catholics (Nationalists) who belligerently fought for Northern Ireland to be united to the Irish Republic (Eire), freedom fighters or ruthless terrorists? And were really those Protestants (Unionists) who wished it to remain part of the UK, British or Irish? TO BE (British) OR NOT TO BE (British) ? A graffiti artist unwittingly replied through a scribbling on a derelict wall: "You Brits! Out of Ireland!" "But I was born here!" "Then you are Irish; not British!" By all accounts, the English of English birth felt superior to the English of Irish birth; such a stick-in-the mud attitude was what former Northern Ireland Secretary John Reid tried to dismiss as out of place in today's multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan Britain. He wholeheartedly promised to ascertain that both those of an Irish background or an Irish consciousness would have their rights protected -irrespective of background; although this "Under Siege" mentality had been the name of the game for nearly half a century & applied to both nations -as the Republicans also felt outgunned and outpowered by the British. Is the conflict in Northern Ireland {only the most tempestuous years -from 1970 to 2010- are described in this booklet} between two nationalities so close to each other both in terms of geography & genetic make-up ever justified? HOW REAL is the 'REAL IRA' ? After marathon negotiations & a series of false starts, the Hillsborough Castle agreement (an improvement on the Good Friday agreement) was signed by the two former foes on 6th Feb. 2010, ending the stalemate. The Real Ira's chilling admission that it was behind the sinister bomb attack outside M15's headquarters on 12th April 2010 sowed dissension on Devolution Day. Staged an hour after policing & justice powers were transferred from Westminster to Stormont {in accordance with the Hillsborough Castle agreement}, it made Devolution Day go down in Irish history as D-Day. SNIPER AT WORK  QUICK GUIDE With the Easter Uprising of 1916 in Dublin being the climax, revolts of the mainly Catholic Nationalist Community against the mainly Protestant Unionist Community and the UK about the status of Northern Ireland date back to the 12thcentury. Civil war and partition (i.e. twenty-six counties forming a separate state in the north whereas 6 counties remaining within the UK) were landmarks of the turbulent period. Sadly, the Catholic minority in the north were treated as second class citizens when it came to daily concerns such as housing and employment. Violent unrest did not break out until 1969 when Catholic civil rights demonstrations and counter protests by Protestant loyalists (loyal to the British Crown) were a frequent sighting. Determined not to relinquish power, the British abandoned their usual nonchalance and sent troops which clashed with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Loyalist Paramilitary groups were quick to join the armed conflict that left a trail of destruction in both Ireland and the UK. As military operations escalated, N. Ireland's Parliament (Stormont) was suspended and direct rule was imposed by London (Westminster). Throughout the shaky period of the troubles [1970's – 1980's – 1990's] paramilitary units, dissident groups and fringe movements pursued their goals stockpiling weapons; assaulting politicians, police, soldiers and non-combatants alike. Terror was unleashed with tit-for-tat killings being the order of the day. British security forces tried to keep the volatile situation in hand amid controversial episodes of collusive practices and undercover groups. In 1998 the Irish government, the British government and political parties signed the Good Friday Agreement; establishing a power-sharing Executive, Ministerial posts in accordance with party strength and an elected Assembly. Referendums validated the deal in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Eire), which grudgingly wrote off its claims to the North. In 2005 the arms decommissioning body announced that the Provisional IRA (an offshoot of IRA and a thorn in the side of the governments) had put all arms beyond use. Unionists asked for photographic proof but received none. Devolution of policing and justice had been suspended more often than not; most notably in 2002 on charges of spying at Stormont – dropped when one of the defendants turned out to be a British agent!!! rather than a Republican. It eventually came into effect (after endless long-running Anglo-Irish intergovernmental conferences) at Hillsborough Castle in February 2010 – a date which will go down in history. The Conflict in Northern Ireland: Can Violence between the Irish and the British ever be Justified? Formerly known as the Provisional IRA, later just the IRA was the main republican paramilitary organisation that resisted the British in Northern Ireland. The “Official” IRA only asked for recognition of parliamentary politics and the Dail – that is, the Dublin government. Abstaining from politics was deemed to be an article of faith by hardliners, who feared that recognising the Dublin parliament would be an entrenchment of partition. Why did hardliners split to form the “Provisional” IRA? Was action on the streets an instrument of faith and patriotism or an instrument of war and terrorism? Did the Unionist-dominated state misjudge the situation be resisting demands for civil rights and equality for Catholics? Did this misjudgement result in near anarchy and riots forcing even the Irish government to intervene? The ensuing violence and large-scale disturbances stemming from an organisation who had once been accused of failing to defend the Catholics and ridiculed by graffiti-style reading “IRA → I Ran Away” was to last nearly forty years. During these years atrocities shook the world; ceasefires started and paused; secret negotiations between the Irish and the British governments came and went – the death toll rising to approximately 3,700. The REAL IRA's chilling admission that it was behind the sinister bomb attack outside the Army base which houses MI5's Northern Ireland headquarters on Monday 12 April 2010, is a stark reminded of a deteriorating security situation that maximises uncertainty twelve years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. Although the British Army base is in Palace Barracks (Hollywood), it is no over-dramatisation to say that the potentially lethal attempt sowed dissension on Devolution Day. With the sole purpose of creating the most eye-catching international headlines alongside the deepest political impact, it was staged less than an hour after policing and justice powers were transferred from London to Belfast. Will Devolution Day go down in history as the second D-Day for Northern Ireland? “I swear that for the remainder of my life, I will not join or assist any illegal organisation or engage in any violence or counsel or encourage others to do so”. Such was the oath required of internees – a necessary condition on their release. A far cry from the lives they chose to lead. Interment (without trial) was a step introduced in a flimsy effort to reduce violence among republicans. However, 100 internees that had been arrested in a raid were released shortly due to poor intelligence; some – among whom young Mc Guinness – even made their getaway within days. Martin Mc Guinness not only occupied a leading position in the Provisional IRA in 1971 but also came to be known as an IRA Godfather, who engineered a political strategy. The number of internees increased at staggering rates reaching over 900. Collateral damage (23 deaths) was a direct result of this heavy-handed policy implemented by security forces, as Catholics were incensed at the pointless criminalisation of their “heroes” - who were romanticised rather than frowned upon. This support led to easy recruitment from the Catholics. Working behind the scenes, retired British MI6 agent Frank Steele rose to prominence in 1973 when he set up a secret communications channel to the IRA council. Through this he helped London and the IRA occasionally exchange opinions for 30 years despite the absence of actual negotiations. The most acrimonious fights of the period of conflict known as “the troubles” took place in 1972: To start with, 13 civilians were shot in Derry (in the province of Ulster) by the British Army on Bloody Sunday. Surprisingly, the “Official” IRA called a ceasefire and so did the “Provisional” IRA in an attempt to test the waters. IRA leaders met with British officials behind closed doors in the home of a government minister in London. Peace talks failed miserably: Not only did William Whitelaw (Northern Ireland Secretary) turn down requests for withdrawal of troops, but also dismissed them as naïve and infeasible. Although Gerry Adams (member of the IRA delegation) firmly believed that a political strategy was indispensable in the long campaign, 20 bombs detonated in Belfast killing nine and wounding 130 two weeks later. Were the IRA defending the nationalist community or leaving devastation in their wake? On Bloody Friday one would not touch them with a barge pole. “The notion that the IRA was going to rise up and free Ireland was a ridiculous pipe-dream, for the simple reason that we never had the support of the people north and south to do it” IRA leader Cathal Goulding, said. What was the cause of the bitter fight? Religious and cultural traditions came into play: Protestants (Unionists) want N. Ireland to remain united with the UK whereas Catholics (Nationalists) want it to be united with the Irish Republic. Did this divergence of opinion justify blood-curdling events, bombings, shootings and atrocities that led to the death of 3,700 people – most of whom civilians? Not until the reader goes over the deep resentment of the Catholics, who felt they were systematically discriminated against and the apprehension of the Unionists about Protestant dominance hanging in the balance, can “The Troubles” be brought to light. Disenchantment with both the 1920 Government of Ireland Act (that had granted home rule for all affairs – including education and abortion – leaving only six counties in the north as part of the UK) and the British government (that had ordered troops onto the streets in 1969 as well as imposing direct rule in 1972) Unionists and Nationalists alike were tipped over the edge. Paramilitary groups became active and the world recoiled in horror. What was it that led the IRA to reorganise its guerrillas into underground cells in 1976? Did it aim at eliminating the visible presence of the paramilitaries? Could it be that the 1975 ceasefire had knocked their confidence? Was it that London stalled negotiations? Or was it that security forces decisively clamped down the Irish guerrillas? Hadn't the IRA flexed its muscles through the 1978 firebombing that decimated soldiers at Warrenpoint and the one at La MonHouse Hotel that targeted civilians? What about the bloodbath at the Queen's cousin Lord Louis Mountbatten's yacht off the coast of Ireland? “Sinn Fein should agitate about social and economic issues. It should have a big role in publicity and propaganda. It gains the respect of the people which in turn leads to increased support for the cell” IRA strategy document, 1977 How long has the Sinn Fein been “agitating about social and economic issues”? A flashback in the 1920's – when a group of nationalists won the election against the Official Irish Parliamentary Party – will help us to gain insight in its long and tumultuous workings. A former prisoner of the Easter rising, named de Valera rose to prominence in October 1917 raising his hopes high for an independent Republic. With Unionists accepting partition and Nationalists quashing it, the next blast seemed to be round the corner. Against the backdrop of the war, when the Germans started their great offensive in 1918, conscription in Ireland was regarded as necessary by the British government. Sinn Fein, the Catholic Church and Official nationalists opposed the idea and the British scrapped the plan. Having achieved a breakthrough in the Post War election, Sinn Fein were bent on boycotting the Westminster meeting at Dublin's Mansion House in 1919 and on unilaterally declaring Ireland an Independent Republic over which de Valera would preside. A new phase of upheavals had just started with 36 policemen being the casualties and Irish volunteers – who now called themselves the Irish Republican Army – being the snipers. The British retaliated by declaring the Dail (Irish Parliament) illegal and by recruiting reinforcements that formed a special Auxiliary Force consisting of former WW1 officers, who orchestrated lethal reprisals: These culminated in a series of raids in Dublin. Counter reprisals sounded the death knell for 14 British undercover intelligence officers on the first “Bloody Friday” in November 1921. Undaunted, the Irish went on with their local elections amid hunger strikes and riots: Sinn Fein dominated in172 out of 206 districts. The Government of Ireland Act having come into Force a year earlier, a Parliament in Belfast served the six northern counties and the one in Dublin served the twenty-six southern counties. Ever since, the Sinn Fein has been committed to establishing a United Ireland. After being at loggerheads for half a century, the party split off in provisional and official Sinn Fein (the latter representing the workers). Does the current form of the party reflect the split in provisional and official IRA? Are Unionists trying to tarnish the party's reputation by claiming that Sinn Fein and the IRA are closely linked? The party vehemently denies this. When First Minister David Trimble banned Sinn Fein from taking up seats in the Northern Ireland Executive Body – unless the IRA disarmed, the party was within its rights to get infuriated as it had backed the Good Friday Agreement on condition cross-border bodies and the Republic's territorial claims were sanctioned. Attendance at the Cabinet is in keeping with the Agreement; regardless of the IRA's chequered history. Despite having 18 seats at the Assembly, its two MP's: Gerry Adams and Martin Mc Guinness could not sit in Parliament as they would not go out of their way to take an oath of allegiance to the Queen. What was the role of hunger strikes in the Troubles? Was Bobby Sands one of republicanism's most celebrated martyrs using the “Armalite and ballot box” strategy to bolster Ireland's position or was he slitting his own throat? In fact, he put himself on an equal footing with the leaders of the 1916 uprising and is still hailed as a hero. In addition, he persuaded the younger IRA leaders that military tactics had to be used hand in hand with political action. Did he achieve this through his 14-year jail sentence in 1977, or through the public outcry on a global scale against the UK's malicious strategy of defeating the IRA through criminal courts and incarcerating them in Maze Prison without prisoner-of-war status? Could it be through British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's heavy-handed tactics that incited more membership for IRA or simply through his funeral (attended by 70,000 embittered people)? Whatever the answer, this stance will always be echoed in his proclamation: “Who here believes that we can win the war through the ballot box? But will anyone object it if, with a ballot paper in one hand and the Armalite in the other we take power in Ireland?” Danny Morrison, Sinn Fein Conference, 1981 In 1980 Gerry Adams was at the forefront of attention as a Sinn Fein strategist – right after doing time in the 70s under suspicion of inciting republicanism and nationalism. He single-handedly primed the party to drop its abstentionist policy from the Irish Parliament: this way Republicans would show recognition for the Irish state and political solutions would be their overriding considerations rather than military ones. It was his conviction that the British wanted to disengage from a military campaign – a view that was reiterated 30 years later by Gordon Brown: “Democracy is not achieved through the barrel of a gun”. This landmark move helped him win the 1983 election, thereby becoming president of Sinn Fein at the West Belfast Constituency. The same controversial issue split the IRA into Official and Provisional in 1969. In the meantime, Denis Bradley acted as a go-between senior IRA figures and MI6; more specifically his contribution towards a ceasefire and his enticing the rivals to the negotiating table was major. Both peaceful campaigns backfired when veteran southern leaders demonstrated their downright inflexibility by walking out and setting up the breakaway Sinn Fein that was allegedly linked to the dissident CONTINUITY IRA. On top of that, loyalist paramilitaries engineered a 1984 attack against Adams holding him responsible for hamstringing their operations; he narrowly escaped. So did Margaret Thatcher in room 629, in Brighton Grand Hotel on 12 October 1984 when IRA's chief Explosives Officer Patrick Magee – nicknamed the 'Chancer” – carried out the most audacious plan in the name of politics: the attempted assassination of the entire British Cabinet. Magee was single-minded: all he could think of was how to “get the Brits out of Ireland”. His English upbringing made him the ideal undercover agent – relying on his specialisation in bombings he thoroughly pursued his goal to get revenge for Thatcher's hard-line stance over the death of hunger strikers. The latter were freedom fighters for the Irish but unscrupulous terrorists for the British. Miraculously, Thatcher got off unscathed, so his plan did not come to fruition. “Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always” – a warning that the IRA were hell-bent on squandering the peace process. 'The Chancer' was brought back to reality with a bang when Scotland Yard traced him through a fingerprint extracted from the registration card for Room 629: he received eight life sentences. However, he was released under the terms of the Good Friday Peace Accord – remorseful over the five deaths and the thirty-four injuries in Brighton. At a subsequent interview he wondered, in retrospect, if the Tory ruling class – walking on a political tightrope on the Northern Ireland issue at the time – had expected to remain immune from what their front-line troops were doing to the Irish. He was quick to point out that the IRA had been given more leverage than if they had actually killed Mrs Thatcher, which would have made it impossible for at least a generation in the British establishment to get the peace process back on the rails. A glimmer of hope in the crisis rumbling on appeared in 1987 when Sinn Fein put forward the suggestion of written guarantees for unionists upon accepting a united Ireland. British officials lost no time in shelving the proposal. Therefore, Republican strategists missed out on the chance to engage their rivals politically. The same year, the deleterious effect of IRA's Enniskillen bomb causing a dozen civilian casualties on Remembrance Sunday led to security forces retaliating by killing a dozen IRA members on Gibraltar and elsewhere. The tit for tat practices only triggered more violent attacks. Nevertheless, – to give death squads credit when it is due – both SDLP leader John Hume and Jerry Adams were spurred to resume negotiations that would sway Republican thinking; eventually politicising the opponents. Along with Oxford-educated Martin Mansergh (adviser to three Irish prime ministers) who helped form the foundations towards a ceasefire, the two leaders talked Republicans into re-considering Dublin's relation with London and Belfast. How long have these two ethnic groups (Irish versus Anglo-Irish) been struggling to “re-consider”? Wasn't it nearly a century ago when De Valera's government dropped the oath of loyalty to the British monarch – agreed under the 1921 Treaty – adamantly refusing to pay land annuities to Britain? Wasn't the trade war with exorbitant tariffs on merchandise a corollary of this disobedience? Admittedly, rebellion had already come in waves from 1916 to 1921 forcing the British to grant Eire (the country's Gaelic name) the “Status of Dominion”. Through unwavering efforts Ireland severed all ties with the Commonwealth in 1949 and declared itself an independent Republic – a major blow to all-mighty Britain. After half a century of pondering, thinking and re-thinking the Republicans had Gerry Adams re-invigorate relationships with SDLP leader John Hume in the make-or-break year of 1993. Chastised by N. Ireland Secretary Sir Patrick Mayhew: “It is not sensible to suppose that any British government will yield to an agenda prosecuted by violent means” and encouraged by a Downing Street Declaration that promised: “doors would open” the IRA moved towards a cessation of violence. UK Prime Minister John Major and Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds worked hand in glove for 2 years to prepare the Anglo-Irish peace pact that aimed at politicising Republicans and re-assuring Unionists. The Anglo-Irish peace pact was a joint declaration that clearly stated: “the British Government accepts … they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland” as well as “the Irish Government accepts … it would be wrong to impose a united Ireland”. The declaration certainly went down well with the public – a response summed up eloquently by a BBC journalist: “Whether a historic opportunity becomes a historic event depends on whether the IRA stops; the loyalist paramilitaries stop; the non-political talks not just taking place, but succeeding” BBC news / 15 Dec. 1993 Albert Reynolds went on to develop a good working relationship with Gerry Adams and nudged Unionists to change direction “away from the cul-de-sac of violence” by “looking back at the failure of the armed conflict where there'll be no military victory of either side” ON THE RECORD – Interview with Albert Reynolds. Actions speak louder than words, according to an English adage: ten people blown up on Shankill Road in a merciless attack against loyalist paramilitary leaders, eight bombs detonated in England by the IRA. Loyalists did not try to mend fences: seven people shot in Greysteel, several SDLP members assaulted. After the fury had subsided, the Republicans brushed aside their initial reservations about the Downing Street Declaration and re-affirmed their continuing quest for peace through never-ending, tortuous debates. It turned out that John Major had a point when he described the Pact as a “gauntlet for peace” seeing it as a stepping stone that went a long way removing some of the fears. Like a bolt from the blue, President Bill Clinton granted Gerry Adams a US Visa – which the British resented but the Irish-Americans celebrated [emigration to the United States from 1845-1849 had built strong ties between the two countries]. Were the Declaration and the ensuing talks a quick fix? Whatever happened to the old American adage: “If you want peace, get ready for war”? To everyone's astonishment the IRA called 'a complete cessation of military operations' in August 1994; the loyalists followed suit in October. How deep did the Americans delve into the conflict that had afflicted Ireland and Britain all this time (“this was a journey that had taken Irish Republicans 75 years to make” – Gerry Adams, 1997) and whose role was paramount in re-energising the talks which led to the ceasefire and – in the long run – to the Good Friday Agreement? Former US Senator George Mitchell's report on arms engineered a policy dealing with weapons separately; thus allowing room for talks before decommissioning – much to the dismay of Unionists who “feared that they would be coerced in some way or bombed into a United Ireland against their will” (Albert Reynolds, 1993). If the Unionists' fears were unfounded and the re-assurances they sought about a permanent ceasefire an over-reaction, would the London Docklands bomb in 1996 be described as a twist of fate? Republicans pointed the finger at John Major for the wasted opportunity. But why should they? Wasn't it thanks to top-level negotiations between the Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair – who arrived in N. Ireland to give their approval and total support to the deal – that headway was made? Wasn't it Blair who was committed to resolving the issue? Wasn't it Blair who appealed to: “republican and unionist … nationalist and loyalist … to collectively build a new future based on justice and peace”? Apparently, his pleas fell on deaf ears. Sinn Fein relied on its electoral gains – the best results so far – to highlight its mandate. By 1997 the leadership of the party was in Downing Street, unequivocally supporting the Good Friday Agreement: a fact which heralded a turnaround in republican thinking. A) Legitimate power sharing B) the tenet of consent C) the question of arms – had all gained due recognition. So, what drove a wedge among IRA members? What urged them to utter the inflammatory statement: “those who demand the decommissioning of IRA weapons lend themselves inadvertently or otherwise to the failed agenda which seeks the defeat of the IRA”. Did they all wish to continue along the road of the arms conflict (hurt by partition having been cemented) or had some members on the margins made up their minds to remain deeply hostile? Could it be just to see their gestures matched by scaling down and eventually withdrawing the British military presence in N. Ireland? Only the REAL IRA, which was formed after the confrontation and assumed responsibility for the Omagh bomb (29 deaths in the immediate blast) could fell the tale. As long as the IRA believed itself to be an undefeated and legitimate army waging war against injustice, the peace process was on a wing and a prayer. Therefore, the Unionists reacted with scepticism to the IRA's commitment to abandoning “the bullet and the bomb” and “assisting the search for justice and peace”. What exactly did the “bullet and the bomb” comprise? Light, medium and heavy ordinance like automatic weapons, ammunition, explosives material in quantities considerably larger than what had been previously put beyond use. Munitions that could have caused death and devastation on a huge scale, according to Andrew Sens (member of the international decommissioning body). An ominous sign was that they exercised their option not to disclose details on the consignment of weapons that took place on a retired Canadian general's guard in keeping with the government scheme. The Canadian, General John de Chastelain, head of the Independent International Commission oversaw the decommissioning and described it as a key issue that marked an essential development. Was the deadlock broken? The release of paramilitary prisoners – a radical move – was welcomed by all sides who held their breath expecting these transformations would be stepping stones to implementing the Good Friday Agreement whose role was in setting up a Northern Ireland Assembly was crucial. A power-sharing Executive that would reform the policing and criminal justice issues would be next. Why did Bill Clinton put himself in the line of fire? Needless to say, Washington's unflinching support to London was undermined by Clinton's three official visits to Northern Ireland; on top of granting a visa to Gerry Adams – moves that infuriated John Major, who (at the time) was striving to ride the storm on thorny issues such as Panorama Documentary's investigation into collusion between the British Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland and loyalist death squads being held accountable for murders. More specifically, the MI5 was also accused of repeated attempts to recruit informers and harassment – in a way that was reminiscent of the CIA – of Republicans. The “Licence to Murder” Documentary of the Panorama Series received comments ranging from “I do not condone members of military intelligence acting outside their chain of command”; to “the notion that the British Army/Government could have orchestrated these murders and then brushed them under the carpet is easy to believe in this cynical age”; to “I am English but I could not watch these programmes without crying from pity and shame”. So, was Clinton a tireless campaigner for peace – mercifully pursuing demilitarisation for the zone, ready to come to the rescue of the aggrieved or was he trying to manipulate Sinn Fein in the future? The jury was out on the question; still, Clinton revelled in his foreign policy breakthrough. Would-be president Clinton's first encounter with an Irish audience was at the Northern Irish Forum, in Sheraton Hotel, New York, back in 1992 when he was sneered at having offered only spin and hype by “just another promise” mistrustful faces. The key elements to his strategy being: A) Granting a visa for Adams that guaranteed Sinn Fein a position in the political arena; B) Masterminding the “Mitchell Commission”; to oversee the Good Friday Agreement; C) Officially visiting Northern Ireland himself Clinton moved on – unfazed – to use the Good Friday Agreement as an example of how to resolve conflict in world trouble spots. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be pointed out that by sitting on the fence; by emphasising how much the conflicting populations have in common; by taking advantage of a creatively and brilliantly ambiguous document which guaranteed both sides a victorious spirit-confirming that neither side had yielded, he reminded Northern Ireland leaders that they had come a long way. The contradictory notions in the Agreement were so dexterously used that a senior IRA leader – previously overly defensive – hailed it as a document “our dead can live with”. Martin Mc Guinness radiant smile, Peter Robinson's out-of-character light-hearted mood, as well as six hundred Irish-Americans beaming in the audience at the Clinton Global Initiative session at the same hotel in 2009 showed that Clinton had achieved the unfeasible – as he had dreamt the undreamt of. The pathway to peace in a divided society put the Northern Ireland conflict in an international context, as all congratulated Clinton on exercising political magic on Northern Ireland leaders in the world stage. 7,000 miles away: this ambiguity that served Clinton's purposes well threw a spanner in the works for republicans who insisted that if the “causes of conflict” were removed, guns would be removed {counting Crown Force guns in} and unionists, who were not satisfied with either policing or security reforms. Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble's statement at the party conference that a “phantom” IRA disbandment did not meet their requirements and the subsequent Assembly suspension prompted the IRA to withdraw the offer. Back to square one? In the sour atmosphere of 2001, a watershed in the development of the conflict occurred: the September 11 strikes of the Twin Towers in the United States led to public condemnation of terrorists who would go to any lengths to demonstrate clout. Painfully aware of the consequences of tenacity of purpose, Adams called on to the IRA to make a groundbreaking move and prove genuine intentions to follow the road of peace – a tactical masterstroke? Or was he pacified himself by a prior invitation to Downing Street by Tone Blair (UK Prime Minister in 1997) being the first Republican leader since Michael Collins back in 1921)? The IRA acquiesced in consigning weapons under the watchful eye of the population who had been witnessing the makeover of Republican strategy from a guerrilla army to an astute political machine – all the time wondering “is the war over”? “Is the war over” a wistful phrase repeated a million times during the cataclysmic events of World War II, when hapless Churchill made plans to invade Ireland at the insistence of Northern Ireland Prime Minister Lord Craigavon (a staunch unionist) on the pretext that Irish leader Eamon de Valera had been irrevocably influenced by the Nazis. In 1940, a Sunday Times report read that Scottish and Welsh troops were highly recommended for the invasion – aiming at ousting Eamon de Valera, securing the naval bases Cork and Queen on the Irish Coastline, and installing a military governor head-quartered in Dublin but in charge of the entire Ireland. The memorandum brashly went on to suggest handing out leaflets in Gaelic and English re-assuring the population that they were deployed merely for their protection. According to Dr Eamon Phoenix (historian at Queen's University, Belfast) this 'camouflage' attempt to subvert the Irish state would be a gift to the IRA, who “would have launched waves after wave of guerrilla attacks”. The plan was not high on Churchill's agenda; but as soon as Field Marshall Montgomery was commanded to prepare his regiments for the occupation of Ireland (whose defeat was a foregone conclusion) it was estimated that it would be one of the costliest and messiest ventures. It goes without saying that history buffs rejoiced when the war archives were declassified; prompting the publication of several books: “Britain, Ireland and the Second World War” by Ian Wood being head and shoulders above the rest. WWII: a tragic war fraught with dreams broken; hopes dashed; unimaginable pain inflicted on an entire continent; ultimatums scaring the living daylights out of commanders, troops and civilians alike. “Disband or the peace process cannot continue” was Tony Blair's petrifying ultimatum in 2002. The IRA adamantly refused: “we will not accept the imposition of unrealisable demands”. They withdrew from the decommissioning body venting their pent-up frustration at others breaking commitments. Unionists' grievances were: A) street violence continued unabated, B) a police raid in Sinn Fein's Stormont office insinuated dealings were not above board C) a break-in at the Castlereach base looked an ominous sign. The ensuing crisis in a peace process dogged by mistrust led to devolution being once more suspended as unionists walked out. To everyone's bewilderment, at a Republican gathering, Sinn Fein's Alex Maskey – first mayor of Belfast – paid tribute to the British war dead, as well. An action without precedent, the wreath came to symbolise harmony and peace for years to come. The IRA, in turn, made an apology: “the future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt – that includes all the victims of the conflict combatants and non-combatants.” “Acts of completion”, a misnomer for plans of disbandment, failed to materialise in 2003: described as a stalemate year. In October – out of the blue – the IRA announced the “final closure of this conflict”; a setback for the deals being that John de Chastelain could not divulge details of the third step of consigning weapons on the grounds of confidentiality. Mitchell Mc Laughlin (who had long been considered a political pundit ushering in strategies that addressed issues through debate) could not come up with any kind of compromise. Similarly, the Sinn Fein chairman had failed to provide answers at the Bloody Sunday Inquiry concerning Martin Mac Guinness' role in the events – the issue has remained a question mark to this day. Increasingly disillusioned, hard-liner David Trimble complained that the Republicans were not ready to bury the hatchet yet; adding that they had blown their cover and revealed their true intentions. George Mitchell commended that they were not out of the woods yet, as signing the Agreement and putting it in practice were poles apart. London offered the tantalising option of November elections but to no avail: the Assembly would not sit. In all fairness, Chief Constable Hugh Orde (in 2004) reported on the increase in paramilitary punishments committed under the guise of community policing – which he attributed to lack of elections. This increase in violence culminated in a year of lawlessness: 2005 has been called the year of a “highly imperfect ceasefire”. Why did the peace deal collapse at the eleventh hour? For a start, the British government used corroborative evidence in a £26,5 million robbery at the Northern Bank to maintain that the IRA and criminality were intertwined. Next, a spate of horrendous murders put the PSNI (Police Service of Northern Ireland) on high alert. Catholic civilian Robert Mc Cartney was stabbed and Catholic ex-REAL IRA member Martin Conlon was shot; the perpetrators being dissident Republicans – who stepped over the line by killing their own countrymen. The ruthless streak of Unionist groups was evident in the brutal murders of four Protestant civilians – part and parcel of a feud between the LOYALIST VOLUNTEER FORCE and the ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE. In all, twelve conflict-related casualties (most of which in Belfast) shook the region while officials were striving to keep violence at bay in the final countdown to the general election. When the election was held, Sinn Fein supporters were cheered by the strengthening of its position and Democratic Unionist Party members celebrated its victory over the Ulster Unionist Party. The DUP's promise was to countenance paramilitary activism in order to free officers from desks to carry out operational duties. Another issue close to the top of its political agenda was transferring justice powers to Stormont on DUP terms and ensuring that the Northern Ireland Justice Minister would require cross-community support thereby affording a veto to the DUP over who is appointed. Last, it showed great resolve to tackle the devolved institutions head on and to pursue its “Driving Forward Reform Agenda”. Joe Cahill's date of birth coincided with Ireland's wish to become a Dominion – fruitfully pursued in 1920; eventually granted a year later following the first Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921). When Cahill was still in his childhood, Ireland was struggling to lessen its ties to the British: firstly, at the statute of Westminster outlining the new formula governing the British Commonwealth of Nations. This formula stipulated that member states recognised each other's autonomy and were “in no way subordinate to one another”. Under no circumstances would the British have their political and diplomatic interests on a wider stage compromised. As their original splendid plans had been thwarted, they watered down the Agreement by deciding that Commonwealth nations would remain “united by a common allegiance to the Crown.” There should be no need to remind ourselves that de Valera would not succumb to unpalatable demands and had dropped the oath of loyalty to the British Monarch. This tradition has been upheld throughout Republican history – even in the current Parliament there are five Sinn Fein members who are not entitled to vote due to their refusal to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen; this may entail complications if a hung parliament is formed in the 2010 election. In his youth, belligerent Cahill was sentenced to death for killing a policeman; but was given a reprieve (1942) early enough to celebrate Ireland's withdrawal from the Commonwealth (1949). Throughout his adulthood, he bore witness to the Eclipse of the British Empire – spurring him on to found the modern IRA. Down on his luck, in 1970 he was jailed once more for organising IRA's first shipment of Libyan Arms. Intriguingly, in his late years he swore by a political strategy that symbolised the old guard's blessing for politics. The phrase “Siege Mentality” was frequently used by Republican politicians to denote the mindset of the loyalist community in Northern Ireland. As a minority they pictured themselves “under siege”. Paradoxically, the Nationalist community, in turn, had felt beleaguered – being outnumbered and out-gunned by the Brits (=derogatory if used in the contexts of the Troubles) since the year dot. The ideal of Armed insurrection against their “captors” was part of their identity every step of the way. When they were given half a chance to smuggle guns on the luxury British liner, the QE2, to use against those who were holding “Ireland hostage” they did not miss it. Rifles and hand grenades would be stashed on board by IRA members and their sympathisers, according to former IRA commander Brendan Hughes. Hughes would assiduously work on the logistics himself; then, seamen would go ashore in New York; hide the innocuous-looking stuff in their lockers and attend it to Northern Ireland. Belfast men practically controlled docks at the time – thus, whistle-blowing was not a concern. Fuelled by memories of internees; hunger strikes; downtrodden citizens; victimised comrades-in-arms; super-grass trials they waded in their battle. In 1971, British authorities – on the trail of suspects from a Scottish port to Southampton – were aghast to discover 874 sticks of gelignite transported on a single shipment. The Cunard Cruise Line (whose flagship was the QE2) remained unapologetic claiming to be totally unaware of the connivance; later on, some crew members were accused of aiding and abetting the conspirators. Former IRA prisoner Seanna Walsh (cell-mate of Bobby Sands: the first hunger striker to die) articulately read the IRA statement of 28thJuly 2005, which navigated sea changes. He kept it deliberately short and sweet: “the leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally agreed an end to the armed campaign. All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. All volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means. Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever”. Unionists' preposterous demands for snapshots of Oglaigh na hEireann (=soldiers of Ireland) dumping arms were not met. Revd. Harold Good – a member of the arms decommissioning body – who had gained expertise in crowd control during priesthood, said with his quintessentially Anglo-Saxon composure that arms had been consigned “beyond the shadow of a doubt”. Notwithstanding his re-assurances, disarmament of loyalist paramilitary organisations was the next stumbling block. However, the British Administration's giving a clean sheet to the IRA for a “step of unparalleled magnitude” (Tony Blair, 2005) in sync with the conciliatory approach of the Irish government normalised politics. Unionists' voices tailed off. Why were Unionists so vociferous in the first place? Despite (former Northern Ireland Secretary) John Reid's assurances that people in Northern Ireland are valued equally to those in Scotland and Wales – thus, should be offered equal opportunities provided they remain part of the UK, there seem to be some misgivings and inexplicable worries among Unionists. “Just as we are English to the Irish, so we are Irish to the English” is a fear that has yet to be dispelled. By all accounts, in the good old days the English of English birth felt superior to the English of Irish birth. John Reid went on undeterred in his vocation to dismiss such a stick-in-the-mud attitude as out of place in today's multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan Britain. He wholeheartedly promised to do everything in his power to ascertain that both those of an Irish background or an Irish consciousness and those who felt more British would have their rights protected – irrespective of background. A graffiti-artist unwittingly replied through a scribbling on a university wall: − Brits out of Ireland! − But I was born here! − Then you are Irish; not British! “Voices from the Grave” compiled by Ed Moloney: the story of Sean Mc Conville [mother of ten, abducted, interrogated and shot by the IRA as a British Army informer] may be a drop in the ocean compared to thousands of senseless deaths connected to the Troubles, but it sheds light on the issue of the “Disappeared” – which has been described as the most vicious legacy of the conflict. Was Sean a compassionate woman who went to the aid of a British soldier wounded outside her porch in 1974, or a 'snitch' who was caught hiding a British Army transmitter in her home on two occasions? Does the public outcry: “those who would forever stand in judgement on the shame and guilt of the murderers” give a clue? Hardly … Whatever the answer, president Jerry Adams is incriminated as this chance discovery after 3 decades will culminate in a lawsuit by Mc Conville's daughter. A late former IRA commander and close confidante of Adams, Brendan Hughes accused him of “sitting in his plush office in Westminster or Stormont or elsewhere and deny it {that murders were committed under his watch} it's like Hitler denying the Holocaust”. Did Mc Conville collude with the security forces or was Brendan Hughes (who made tapes for the Boston College Archives accompanied by instructions for disclosure after his death – which occurred in 2008) indirectly attacking the strategy of the Republicans – being himself strongly against the peace process and the highly controversial issue of decommissioning? Or, as a commentator put it bluntly: “it was the word of a confessed murderer accusing another”. [New Informer Evidence in Infamous IRA Execution Case – IRISH CENTRAL – published Monday, March 29, 2010, 6:57AM] Adams has always been rumoured to have been a former IRA commander in the 1970's and to have orchestrated not only the Good Friday bombing but several other gruesome attacks and murders of informers as well. However, this time the rumours turned into unholy accusations coming from people from all walks of life and – amazingly enough – from former internees in the Maze Prison (amongst whom Hughes was imprisoned in tandem with Adams). Adams dismisses the accusations as blatant lies told with a view to ruining his chances on the upcoming Westminster election and demonising him so that he will relinquish power. He refutes the arguments by asking his rivals to account for the fact that he encouraged republicans to co-operate with the authorities to find the remains of the ‘Missing’ (informers and objectors). In fact, the Irish Government has announced plans to grant immunity to those whose evidence helps spot the Disappeared. This policy of granting immunity goes back to the 1980's when suspects who would testify in court against their ex-comrades were promised either immunity from prosecution or lenient sentences or new identities. The infamous ‘Supergrass’ terrorist trials – some of the cruellest ever conducted in the UK – could result in rough and ready justice based on evidence upon which a single witness was enough to convict dozens. In one such hair-rising trial (1983) twenty-two IRA members were sentenced to 4,000 years altogether. In the eye of the storm was also the case of ex-paramilitaries Christopher Black and Joseph Benett, whose testimony resulted on the conviction of no less than 300 defendants; some of whom were given the life sentence. The same old story with one hundred republicans arrested on Raymond Gilmour's evidence (member of the INLA – turned informant). Next, an Ulster Volunteer Force trial – rife with speculation – left opponents embroiled in a diplomatic row. When eighteen convictions on Black's evidence were overturned 3 years later, doubt was cast on the reliability of witnesses. The intervention of the then Chief Justice – who remained sceptical of the practice deciding that the evidence was inconclusive in most ‘Supergrass’ trials – was crucial. The last nail in the coffin was suspicions of jury tampering: the policy was phased out. The name ULSTER VOLUNTEER FORCE dates back to Protestants opposing home rule in 1912 but later remaining in obscurity. Half a century later the party bounced back; unashamedly aired its views against liberal unionism and swore to crush IRA members. It reportedly killed dozens including Catholic civilians – the audience of a football match. It has links with the Progressive Unionist Party. The splinter loyalist group RED HAT DEFENDERS was added to the proscribed list after detonating bombs that killed a policeman and the celebrated human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson. The threat level fluctuated from substantial to critical when it committed several crude acts of violence flaring up during the Drumcree crisis in 1998. The LOYALIST VOLUNTEER FORCE formerly led by Billy Wright is a hard core group that did not hesitate to threaten Protestants themselves in case of collusion in the peace process. Moreover, it ignited citizens to vote NO in the Good Friday Agreement referendum. Everyone was astonished when both the RED HAT DEFENDERS and the ORANGE VOLUNTEERS owned up to the same grenade assault in County Antrim. Even more so, when eight heavily armed hooded members of the group brandished their weapons on television and – without watering down their speech – threatened to attack Catholic businesses as well as murder IRA prisoners on their release. How fair was to outlaw the group? Are political groups connected to paramilitary ones? Though Sinn Fein point-blank denies having a military wing, CONTINUITY IRA – a hard-line group defiantly opposing any deal not based on a united Ireland and having admitted responsibility for 96 bombings in Portdown/Moira/Killyhelvin Hotel – is thought to be linked to the party by security forces. Are all groups out in the open? Not so. DIRECT ACTION AGAINST DRUGS – related to several killings dating to 1995 and seven murders disgracefully committed during the first ceasefire – is a cover name for IRA. Are politicians among the casualties? IRISH NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY weapons have killed more than 120 people including a conservative MP and one of Margaret Thatcher's senior advisers whose car was blown up at the House of Commons in 1979. INLA gunmen also shot dead Billy Right inside Maze Prison in 1997, an incident that sparked off a cycle of violence but also led to secret talks between the INLA and intermediaries of the British Government. Has the so-called OFFICIAL IRA been overshadowed? This is the more socialist line of the group historically linked to Sinn Fein; it still exists but when people refer to the IRA nowadays they mean the PROVISIONAL IRA: this is the group that (after the cut-off date of 1969) rather than falling into line with the socialists became more militant; first standing up for the Catholics – later going on the offensive. How real is the REAL IRA? A disaffected former IRA general led the splinter group to show indignation at talks shoring up the peace process. Having owned up to attacks including a 500lb car bomb that wiped out the market town of Banbridge, as well as having carried out two murders during the ceasefire, the group was kind enough to apologise for civilian deaths in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing in 1998. “A war machine is once again being directed at the British Cabinet” was the REAL IRA's explanation for a mortar attack on a police station thereby earning its reputation as the most dangerous group – defying even the Good Friday Agreement which could safeguard that IRA prisoners are eligible for early release. Weren't there any Unionist groups sinning in good company? Despite counting thousands of supporters at its peak, claiming to be pro-talks and pro-Agreement – in addition to having the Ulster Defence Party as its political wing, the ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION was proscribed for being single-mindedly engaged in terrorism. The ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS group – primarily known as self-styled vigilantes avenging the murder of loyalist leader Billy Wright in the Maze Prison – is linked to the Ulster Democratic Party, which was suspended from the peace process temporarily as a safety valve. In 2006 for nationalists and unionists working together in a coalition government in tandem with an assembly legislating was a tall order. Still, they were given a deadline to be met on 27 March 2007, by which date they needed to have resolved conflict. The Assembly having been designed to lay down the rules of the Good Friday Agreement, it had to work on two essential changes: 1) Administration should be devolved from London to Belfast. 2) The two political leaders on Unionists and Republicans should peacefully share power without infringing on each other's rights. The sum of fears being IRA bombings, the Democratic Unionist Party had consistently opposed power sharing with Sinn Fein claiming that it was “indistinguishable” from the IRA, a charge that had led to an impasse. To add insult to injury, the Republicans were accused of spying at Stormont. The knock-on effect of all allegations and recriminations was a police raid at Sinn Fein offices; a flat refusal by Ulster Unionists to sit in government with Sinn Fein and a suspension of the Assembly and Executive by the Northern Ireland Secretary, who – unsurprisingly – returned rule to London. The hopes of both the British and the Irish governments to make headway through the 2003 Assembly Elections were dashed: positions hardened and negotiations became more uncompromising despite the IRA's pledge to put their weapons beyond use – and the Independent Commission Monitoring Disarmament verifying this. Both governments' endeavours to broker a deal were hindered, not least by a Unionist outcry over the robbery of £26m from the Northern Bank in Belfast – which was allegedly committed by the IRA (the evidence was unsubstantiated, though). Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern tried to kick-start the negotiations in 2006 following the revelation that the spy at Stormont was a British agent – later avenged by Republicans. The effort paid off: the St. Andrews Agreement – which paved the way to a power-sharing government – was signed. According to the Agreement: − Sinn Fein would call a halt to opposing the police − Power would be shared between Republicans and Unionists − An election would precede the formation of a coalition government If the proposals of the Agreement were rebuffed: − The Stormont Assembly would be closed − Politicians' salaries would be stopped − Allowances would be done away with Did the ramifications in case of non-compliance galvanise the parties? Firstly, the Sinn Fein took a step in the right direction concerning the police – without actual commitment. Secondly, the Democratic Unionist Party consented to sitting at the negotiating table on condition Republicans made a move beyond decades of unabated violence and terrorism. Brushing aside dissenters' objections and confirming an election, a transitional Assembly was installed in 2006. After a series of false starts (that lasted over a decade) on the devolution of policing and justice power from London to Belfast, the people of Northern Ireland will have the chance to begin afresh in Castle Buildings, in Stormont where the headquarters of the New Department of justice will be located. Deputy First Minister Martin Mc Guinness notified the Assembly on March 9th, 2010 that a decision had been reached on what has been called the “final piece of the devolution jigsaw” after prolonged negotiations between the DUP and Sinn Fein. In the face of fierce opposition by the Ulster Unionist Party – that wished to address issues like unemployment, the economy and the way forward – Martin Mc Guinness along with First Prime Minister Peter Robinson brought a motion, which was eventually passed on a consent vote. Mr Mc Guinness admitted that they would have to go through unchartered waters; so he could not dismiss the opposition's fears about the venture as unfounded. Nevertheless, he was confident the Hillsborough Agreement was to the benefit of the community, who were ready to follow this course of action by taking on the transfer of policing and justice matters – as stipulated by the Good Friday Agreement, signed in 1998. He did not conceal his disenchantment with the UUP's lack of support on such a long-awaited resolution, which he attributed to cynicism and intransigence; adding that it was high time all parties brushed aside political aspirations and expedience for the sake of unity. UUP's deputy leader Danny Kennedy bitterly complained that “key decisions took place elsewhere … they ought to have been dealt with at Stormont but they were dealt with at Hillsborough” and did not hesitate to verbally attack “this coalition of loathing … this political carve-up”. He pointed out threateningly that “it wasn't a member of the UUP who said policing would never happen in a political lifetime … it wasn't a member of the UUP who said it wouldn't even happen in the lifetime of this assembly” – thus reminding the coalition that other parties' expectations had been exceedingly low. In conclusion, Assembly and Executive Review Committee chairman Jimmy Spratt emphasised the role of the attorney general and matters that were still under consideration, such as: the creation of a Justice Sector for the North-South Ministerial Council as well as the Serious Organised Crime Agency. * * * * * Could that be the end of the Game? Or will Policing and Justice be the Bone of Contention for the next decade or so? When Jeffrey Donaldson (DUP – Lagan valley) asked: “what message does the member think the IRA dissidents who exploded a bomb outside Newry Courthouse would have for this House today? Would they be opposing Devolution?” Ian Paisley Jnr. (DUP – North Antrim) responded belligerently: “I sit beside a man who was shot by the IRA … I don't like outside interference … but it does not take away from our duty as members of this House … it is exactly the taking on of these tough decisions that will make this House noble instead of a House of ridicule … we should not rise to the scare tactics that Sinn Fein will not support operational decisions. On issues raised about national security opponents said publicly that N. Ireland is not like any part of the UK - the fact of the matter is: it is the same as the rest of the UK … National Security is embedded because it is a national security issue … Why? Because we are not a place apart, but we are a place within … A place within the Union.” Policing and Justice Debate, 9 March 2010 What conclusions can be drawn from this debate? That the St Andrews Agreement is running out of steam? Or that the Map of Europe should be redrawn? “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies and statistics”, Mark Twain is quoted as saying. What exactly did he find so unnerving about statistics? Here is a recent example: 75% of the people in Northern Ireland strongly support the proposed changes in policing agreed by the coalition government former foes Sinn Fein and pro-British Democratic Unionist Party have stitched up; after clocking up 100 hrs of painstaking negotiations at Hillsborough. Still, Raymond Mc Cartney of Sinn Fein cried out that discontented Republican supporters have been rightly staging pickets to eliminate incidents of stop and search tactics – neither needed nor sought in the current political climate. Especially when they are conducted at schools where children of Republicans are regularly frisked, these stealth policies rekindle simmering Anglo-phobic feelings as the police are viewed as the embodiment of their Protestant Unionist enemies and British rule. This deep-seated resentment against the police as their prime target stands in sharp contrast to the earnest plea toward the 32-County-Sovereignty-Movement to retract its threat to picket schools as well as shops. “No dealings whatsoever with the police!”: the political wing of the REAL IRA has menacingly said. Unless the threat is withdrawn, this zero-tolerance toward the PSNI (Police Service Northern Ireland) will be a disincentive for the normal co-operation between young citizens and security forces whose centrepiece is to fight criminality of any kind. {“Crime is Crime is Crime”, 1981 Thatcher's response to a special category status for those imprisoned on paramilitary-related charges} The symbiotic relationship is further complicated by regular disruptions of hoax and genuine bomb alerts – like the deeply demoralising attack in Newry in Feb. 2010: marking the 25thanniversary of a mortar attack killing nine officers in Newry Square. Standing in the wreckage, officials did not mince their words: they lamented the reluctance of disenchanted young people to walk the much-awaited “path of peace”. By unreservedly condemning the disingenuous plan that left political structures hanging in the balance, they set the tone for the debate. Politics professor John Tonge claims that “dissident violence never quite goes away. It ebbs and flows”. John Mooney (author) maintains the IRA has not been deglamourised by Irish people –driven to despair living through a slump often regarded as the fallout of “the Troubles”. To make matters worse, British Intelligence Services working behind the scenes have been described as 'marauding soldiers'. The last straw – analysts say – is the faction “SOLDIERS OF IRELAND”: a rising force shrouded in mystery and getting on with the business of terrorism. Things came to a head when another harrowing murder case unravelled in Londonderry. Forensic experts meticulously searched for clues leading to the identity of the perpetrators; they needn't have. The REAL IRA admitted to the border killing – showing blithe disrespect for justice and casting doubt on Hume's trailblazing speech. “For the first time the people of both sides of the border have been speaking as one”. John Hume (leader of Social Democratic and Labour Party) All things considered, the Hillsborough Castle Agreement may have averted Belfast's fragile coalition from crumbling but it failed to win over all groups due to political disaffection. In Northern Ireland the Easter Lily (symbol associated with the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin) is still worn as a flower of remembrance for those who sacrificed their lives to the cause of independence; and unrest is rumbling on … References ● Eclipse of Empire D. A. Low – Cambridge University Press ● The Oxford Companion to 20thCentury British Politics – Oxford University Press ● Mister, Are you a Priest? D. Edward – Four Courts Press ● A Farewell to Arms? From Long War to Long Peace in Northern Ireland M. Cox – Manchester University Press ● CAIN Web Service Conflict and Politics in Northern Ireland (1968 to Present) ● Atlas of the World – University of London ● Irish Central – home to Irish Voice and Irish America magazine ● The Life and Times of Winston Churchill – Items of Interest: Google ● War, Ceasefire, Endgame – BBC N. Ireland ● Albert Reynolds, ON RECORD – Google ● Tony Blair, Take Guns out of Politics – BBC N. Ireland ● Devolution Unlikely to Tame N. Irish Rebels – Reuters
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